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Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association:
Making the Medicaid Reimbursement
Rate Challenge a Federal Case
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court in Wilder v. Virginia
Hospital Ass'n' has endorsed a system of judicial review of
Medicaid 2 reimbursement rates that ironically may perpetuate a
deprivation of health care for the needy. Medicaid reimburse-
ment rates affect the availability of health care services and the
overall quality of care provided to the poor. 3 Because states re-
spond to federal budget cuts by reducing Medicaid reimburse-
ment rates, health care providers are encouraged to reduce the
quality and scope of services they offer."
In 1980, in an effort to alleviate spiraling health care costs
associated with the Medicaid program, Congress adopted the
Boren Amendment to the Federal Medicaid Act.' The Amend-
1. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
2. Medicaid is a federally funded, state administered health care reimbursement
program that offers benefits to indigent persons who are either disabled, blind, over
sixty-five years of age, or members of families with dependent children. Kenneth R.
Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Program, 33 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983).
3. Mitchell D. Raup, Medicaid Boycotts by Health Care Providers: A Noerr-Pen-
nington Defense, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1393, 1413 (1984).
4. See Wing, supra note 2, at 85.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982). The Boren Amendment provides:
A state plan for medical assistance must . . . provide . . . for payment . . . of
hospital ... services provided under the plan through the use of rates (determined
in accordance with methods and standards developed by the State and which, in
the case of hospitals, take into account the situation of hospitals which serve a
disproportionate number of low income patients with special needs... ) which the
State finds and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically
operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with appli-
cable state and federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards and to
assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable access (tak-
ing into account geographic location and reasonable travel time) to inpatient hos-
pital services of adequate quality; and such state makes further assurances, satis-
factory to the Secretary, for the filing of uniform cost reports by each hospital ...
1
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ment replaced inflationary Medicaid reimbursement practices
with provisions premised on a cost-containment methodology.'
The revised regulations' mandate state reimbursement of Medi-
caid providers through rates that are "reasonable and adequate"
to meet the costs of "efficiently and economically operated
facilities."7
On June 14, 1990, the Wilder Court held that the Boren
Amendment created a substantive federal right for health care
providers to "reasonable and adequate" reimbursement
rates - a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 Because
the Supreme Court recognized that, in addition to the Medicaid
patient, the health care provider is an intended beneficiary of
the Boren Amendment,9 health care facilities have been given
the green light to seek federal judicial review of a state's Medi-
caid reimbursement practices.
However, in an effort to maintain the intended balance be-
tween state and federal program administration, the Court has
suggested that a "deferential standard of review"' 0 of reimburse-
ment rates established under the states' already broad discretion
is appropriate." Thus, although providers have been granted the
section 1983 route to review, judicial "deference" to state discre-
tion, coupled with a restrictive state administrative appeals pro-
cess and minimal federal oversight, may effectively insulate re-
imbursement plans from any meaningful, plenary review.' 2
Because health care providers rely substantially on ade-
quate reimbursement revenues for financial viability, 13 this Note
suggests a legislative amendment of the current administrative
and periodic audits by the State of such reports ....
Id.
6. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1990).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1989).
8. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2525.
9. Id. at 2517. Congress enacted the Boren Amendment in 1980, intending the provi-
sions to apply to reimbursement for nursing and intermediate care facilities. Pub. L. No.
96-499, § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980). In 1981, the standard was applied to reimburse-
ment of hospitals. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2173, 95 Stat. 808 (1981). The regulations have
since been applied to intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded. Pub. L. No.
100-203, § 4211(h)(2)(A), 101 Stat. 1330 (1987). Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2513-14 n.2.
10. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2523 n.18.
11. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046, 56,047 (1983).
12. See infra notes 222-33 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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review process. This revision would afford providers a more
meaningful review of state-implemented reimbursement rates,
and facilitate the recovery of funds previously withheld while in-
adequate reimbursement rates were in effect.
Part II of this Note discusses the federal-state cooperative
Medicaid program and the history of the Boren Amendment
provisions. The section includes a discussion of the effects of re-
strictive reimbursement practices on the nation's health care
providers, with special attention given to the plight of public fa-
cilities which serve a disproportionate number of poor patients.
Part III reviews the available forums in which providers
may challenge state violations of the Amendment's reimburse-
ment provisions, focusing on the section 1983 remedy, its his-
tory, its application prior to Wilder, and its limitations as a form
of relief for under-reimbursed health care providers.
Part IV discusses the dispute giving rise to the Wilder deci-
sion, the procedural history and the majority and dissenting
opinions.
Part V analyzes the implications of the Wilder decision.
The section suggests that the Court has frustrated the general
purpose of the Medicaid Act, which is to provide medical care to
the poor, by endorsing the use of expensive section 1983 actions
to remedy state noncompliance with federal regulations. Because
Congress must safeguard the right to the health care that it has
created, a legislative amendment of the current statutory
scheme is in order.14 This Note concludes with a proposed alter-
native legislative scheme.
II. Background
A. Structure of the Federal-State Cooperative Medicaid
Program
The Medicaid program was established in 1965 as Title
XIX of the Social Security Act.'" The purpose of the Act was to
provide medical assistance to a federally designated category of
mandatory recipients including indigents who are blind, dis-
abled, over sixty-five years of age, or members of families with
14. See infra notes 256-73 and accompanying text.
15. Pub. L. No. 89-97 § 1902(13)(B), 79 Stat. 346 (1965).
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dependent children. 6 Under this cooperative federal-state pro-
gram, the federal government, through the Health Care Financ-
ing Administration ("HCFA"), provides the states with grants-
in-aid'" in return for state administration of the program.' 8
To cover the costs of providing medical services to the poor,
states primarily rely on federal contributions, which range from
fifty to eighty-three percent of their actual costs, depending on a
state's relative wealth.19 In addition to this amount, the federal
government contributes approximately fifty percent of the
state's administrative expenses under the Medicaid program, in-
cluding the cost of defending section 1983 challenges for alleged
violations of the Boren Amendment. 0 In 1988, the federal gov-
ernment paid approximately $1.51 billion in state administrative
costs for the Medicaid program."
State participation in the program is described as "volun-
tary," but once a state decides to participate, its receipt of funds
is conditioned on compliance with mandatory federal require-
ments." Federal conditions require that a participating state
submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secre-
tary") a "state plan" setting forth the nature and scope of its
program, and "assurances" that it will be administered in com-
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
17. Through grant-in-aid programs, the federal government retains substantial con-
trol over the aided programs, while state and local governments are responsible for direct
program administration or distribution of funds to recipients. Note, Making Old Feder-
alism Work: Section 1983 and the Rights of Grant-In-Aid Beneficiaries, 92 YALE L.J.
1001, 1002 (1983) [hereinafter Old Federalism].
18. Id.
19. 42 C.F.R. § 433.10(b) (1990). For example:
If a state's per capita income is equal to the national average per capita income,
the federal share is fifty-five percent. If a state's per capita income exceeds the
national average, the federal share is lower, with a statutory minimum of fifty
percent. If a state's per capita income is lower than the national average, the fed-
eral share is increased, with a statutory maximum of eighty-three percent.
Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b)(a)(7) (1988); Brief Amicus Curiae of United States at 2,
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
21. Health Care Financing Administration, Dep't of Health and Human Services,
Medicaid Financial Management Report: Fiscal Year 1988, as cited in Brief Amicus
Curiae of United States at 2, Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990)
(No. 88-2043).
22. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2513.
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pliance with all federal regulations.2 3 The state must also desig-
nate a single agency to administer the state plan"' and must de-
sign and implement an appeals process to redress provider
grievances. 5
Furthermore, the provider is prohibited from implementing
any cost-sharing methodologies for eligible recipients26 and must
accept Medicaid reimbursement as payment in full.2 7 The Secre-
tary is granted the authority pursuant to the Act to terminate or
reduce funding for a state's non-compliance with the enumer-
ated conditions of participation.28
Unlike the state's participation, describing the provider's
participation in the program as "voluntary" is misleading. Non-
profit and public hospitals that have received construction funds
under the Federal Hill-Burton Act 9 are obligated to administer
a state Medicaid program, and are not free to terminate partici-
pation in the program.30 Moreover, hospitals that have emer-
gency rooms and participate in the federal Medicare," program
are required to provide emergency care to all who enter the
emergency room, including Medicaid patients.3 2 Thus, a pro-
vider who is dissatisfied with Medicaid reimbursement rates and
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1988). In developing rates, states must take into considera-
tion the situations of hospitals serving a disproportionate number of low income pa-
tients, must find that its rates are reasonable and adequate, and must assure Medicaid
patients reasonable access to care. Id. at § 1396a(a)(13)(A).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1988).
25. 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(c) (1990). References to the Secretary throughout this Note
will encompass references to the Administrator or Regional Administrator mentioned
throughout the C.F.R.
26. Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 235(a), 81 Stat. 908 (1968). Cost-sharing methodologies,
such as the use of premiums, coinsurance, deductibles and percentages, may be applied
to offset Medicare payments to eligible beneficiaries. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d)(3)(A-D)
(1988).
27. 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (1990).
28. Id. at § 430.35.
29. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982). Known tom-
monly as the Hill-Burton Act, this Act was designed to provide federal grants to en-
courage hospital construction. A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE
ADMINISTRATION 223, 303, 305-08 (1988).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(b)(1) (1984).
31. Unlike the state-administered Medicaid program, Medicare is a federally subsi-
dized health insurance program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to specifically benefit the elderly and the disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) (1988).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988) as cited in Brief for Respondent at 45, Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
1992]
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who prefers to withdraw from participation may be legally
bound to accept Medicaid patients because of its participation
in either federal program.
B. History of the Medicaid Reimbursement Provisions Lead-
ing to the Boren Amendment
From its inception in 1965 until 1972, the Medicaid Act's
reimbursement provisions required states to reimburse providers
for the costs they actually incurred ("actual cost standard").3 3 In
1972, in recognition of the rising costs associated with this meth-
odology,3 4 Congress amended the Medicaid Act and encouraged
states to develop alternative reimbursement schemes. 3 5 Between
1972 and 1980, reimbursement rates were to be determined "on
a reasonable cost-related basis, as determined in accordance
with methods approved and verified by the Secretary" ("reason-
able cost standard"). 6
The actual cost and reasonable cost standards translated
into highly inflationary "retrospective" reimbursement policies 37
that premised payment on actual costs incurred.3 8 Health care
providers consequently had little incentive to promote efficiency
because the more services they provided, the more they were re-
imbursed." During this period, state-determined rates were sub-
ject to direct review by the Secretary, and providers could di-
rectly challenge individual rate determinations by appealing to
the HCFA.40
33. Friedman v. Perales, 668 F. Supp. 216, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 47
(2nd Cir. 1988).
34. Between 1970 and 1971 alone, the annual percent change in federal Medicaid
expenditures was 32.2%. However, in 1972, after implementation of the reasonable cost
standard, the growth of federal expenditures slowed to 23.5%. By 1982, after implemen-
tation of the Boren Amendment's efficiency and economy standard, growth in federal
expenditures had been reduced to an annual rate change of 6.6%. See Wing, American
Health Policy in the 1980's, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 608, 655 (Table 8) (1986).
35. Friedman, 668 F. Supp. at 222.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(E) (1979), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-499 §
962(a) (1980).
37. Retrospective reimbursement methodologies base payment rates on actual
charges or costs incurred, and thus are inflationary. See SOUTHWICK, supra note 29 at
223.
38. See Wing, supra note 2, at 53.
39. See SOUTHWICK, supra note 29, at 223.
40. 42 C.F.R. § 447.261(d)(6) (1979).
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In anticipation of continued reductions in federal Medicaid
funding to the states, and in light of the inflationary nature of
the reasonable cost standard previously employed, Congress
passed the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act in 1980 to
encourage cost-consciousness."' The Boren Amendment man-
dates reimbursement through
rates ... which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory
to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
facilities in order to provide care ... in conformity with ... state
and federal ... quality and safety standards and to assure that
individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable access.
. . to . . . inpatient hospital services .... '1
Pursuant to these amended provisions, the Secretary's scrutiny
of state-implemented reimbursement rates is limited to a review
of the reasonableness of the state's assurances that its rates are
"reasonable and adequate," and does not encompass a direct re-
view of rate determination challenges brought by providers."'
The main purpose of the Boren Amendment was to increase
a state's flexibility and discretion in establishing reimbursement
methodologies that promote efficient delivery of services, while
maintaining federal oversight at the "minimum necessary to as-
sure proper accountability.. . ."" The new "efficiency and econ-
omy" standard promotes use of prospective reimbursement
schemes where rates are determined prior to actual expenditures
and thus are expected to encourage cost containment.45
C. Effects of Restrictive or Inadequate Reimbursement
Practices
While one policy objective of the Medicaid Act is to en-
courage provider participation, in practice, providers are being
driven away through arbitrary or inadequate payment rates."
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
44. S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. at 478 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 744. See also 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046 (1983).
45. See generally 46 Fed. Reg. 47,964-47,973 (1981).
46. Brief of Respondent Virginia Hosp. Ass'n at 45, Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
1992]
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The states have expldited the broad discretion to determine re-
imbursement rates given to them under the Boren Amendment
by setting unreasonably low rates." Many providers have re-
sponded to these inadequate rates with a reluctance to treat
Medicaid patients at all,48 thereby reducing the availability of
and access to needed services for the poor. 9 Providers that have
continued to accept Medicaid patients are given the incentive to
engage in inappropriate medical practices such as "patient
dumping" 50 and skimping on services to reduce costs. 51 Many
Medicaid patients are thus limited to receiving treatment from
public facilities or from "Medicaid Mills," which are high vol-
ume, low quality clinics.52
Health care providers nationwide are experiencing financial
troubles as a result of inadequate reimbursement rates by state
Medicaid agencies. 53 Restrictive reimbursement policies fall
hardest on facilities such as public hospitals and clinics that
serve a disproportionate number of Medicaid patients and that
are indispensable providers of care to the poor.5 4 Since 1985, ap-
proximately 300 public hospitals have been forced to close, due
in large part to low Medicaid reimbursement. 55
Congress has acknowledged that public hospitals and teach-
ing hospitals serving a high number of Medicaid and low income
patients "are particularly dependent on Medicaid reimburse-
ment," and has called on states to "take into account the special
situation that exists in these institutions in developing their
Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
47. See Wing, supra note 2, at 11.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Patient dumping is the practice by private hospitals of unloading unprofitable
patients on public facilities. Diana Vance-Bryan, Medicare's Prospective Payment Sys-
tem: Can Quality Care Survive?, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1417, 1420-21 n.42 (1984). See also
Lowell C. Brown, "Patient Dumping" After OBRA 1989: New Problems For Hospitals
and Physicians Alike, 4 THE HEALTH LAWYER 1, 15 (Spr.-Sum. 1990) (discussing congres-
sional prohibitions against patient dumping).
51. Vance-Bryan, supra note 50, at 1420.
52. Raup, supra note 3, at 1414 n.149.
53. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
54. See Wing, supra note 2, at 89 n.294.
55. Brief Amicus Curiae of Gray Panthers Advocacy Committee at 18, Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
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rates.""6 Despite this congressional mandate, many states have
continued to adopt restrictive reimbursement policies that finan-
cially drain the hospitals.5"
Two California counties recently cited under-funding by
Medi-Cal (California's Medicaid program) as the single cause of
the current crisis that has imperiled the health and safety of
mothers and newborns at their obstetric facilities.58 These public
hospitals are experiencing an overload of patients who are re-
jected from private facilities that have the additional capacity,
but refuse to accept Medicaid patients at the current reimburse-
ment rates.5 9
Inner-city hospitals, which almost exclusively treat the poor,
cannot continue to operate without participating in the Medi-
caid program because they would be rendering care to a majority
of their patients without any reimbursement at all.60 If Medicaid
payments are inadequate, these hospitals may be forced to close
or to declare bankruptcy.6 "
One inner-city hospital experienced a deficit of approxi-
mately $15 million in 1989, which included $12 million in losses
resulting from services provided to Medicaid patients.2 The in-
ability of inner-city hospitals to cut costs is caused in part by
the need to offer high salaries to attract personnel to the area,
the need to offer unique services to attract higher paying pa-
tients, and the need for additional security and parking
56. HR. CONF. R. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 902 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1324.
57. See Wing, supra note 2, at 89 n.294.
58. Money Problems from Birth, L.A. TIMES. Feb. 23, 1990, at B6 (Metro).
59. Id. See also Obstetrics Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1990, at B6 (Metro).
60. Brief Amicus Curiae of Temple University at 6, Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
61. During 1987 and 1988, three Northern Philadelphia hospitals filed for bank-
ruptcy; three more in the area experienced severe financial difficulty and one South Phil-
adelphia hospital closed. Id. at 11 n.11. In June, 1990, Marina Hills Hospital in Ladera
Heights, California, was forced to close following a period of operation under bankruptcy
protection. A hospital administrator cited the failure of the State Medi-Cal System to
pay its current hospital bills as the "final blow" which led to the closing. Nieson Himmel
& John Kendall, Financial Crisis Forces Hospital to Shut Doors, L.A. TIMES, June 3,
1990 at B15 (Metro).
62. Brief Amicus Curiae of Temple University at 3, Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
1992]
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facilities. 3
The hospital closings, staff reductions, and service cuts in
the Boren Amendment's wake are clearly inconsistent with Con-
gress' mandate that the quality of care not be sacrificed to
achieve a state's desired level of cost-efficiency."' Because com-
pliance with the congressional mandate seems minimal at best,
and because cost-containment policies continue to encourage re-
strictive reimbursement patterns and the improper withholding
of benefits due, providers must have access to a forum where
their challenges to state-implemented rates will be subject to
meaningful review.
III. Available Forums for Review of State
Reimbursement Violations
A. Federal Oversight
The federal Medicaid regulations require states participat-
ing in the Medicaid Program to submit a conforming state plan6"
to the Secretary, to make findings and to give annual "assur-
ances" 66 that their rates are "reasonable and adequate. '6 7 How-
ever, the regulations no longer require the establishment of any
formal procedures for providers to bring reimbursement rate
grievances directly to the Secretary's attention.68
The Secretary's scrutiny of state plans and reimbursement
rates is currently limited by federal regulation to a review only
of the reasonableness of state assurances, and does not encom-
pass a review of the actual data and methodology used by the
states to arrive at their reimbursement rates.69 Moreover, the
Secretary is not mandated to investigate the propriety of state
assurances at all. Pursuant to the regulations implementing the
Medicaid Act, a state's assurances "will be deemed accepted and
approved" if the Secretary fails to notify the state of his deter-
63. Id. at 4 n.4.
64. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1988).
66. Id. at § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
67. Id. See also supra note 23.
68. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.1-447.371 (1990).
69. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046, 56,055 (1983).
[Vol. 12:139
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/4
WILDER
mination within ninety days of receipt of those assurances.7" One
court has found the Secretary's role so significantly reduced that
it held that the Secretary had appropriately approved a state's
assurances and overall plan even though subsequent litigation
revealed that the assurances were in fact false.71 Accordingly, re-
ferring to the Secretary's limited supervisory role, courts have
denied the existence of a private right of action against the Sec-
retary for failing to compel the states to comply with the Medi-
caid Act.72
The Secretary retains final authority to approve rates and is
authorized to withhold all or part of the designated federal
funds for a state's noncompliance after reasonable notice and an
opportunity for a hearing. 7 However, in practice the statutorily
authorized funding cutoffs are not frequently used.74 One com-
mentator has noted that the reluctance to apply this sanction
stems from the likelihood of ultimate harm to the individual re-
cipients of the program - the Medicaid patients.75 Yet, the
Secretary's failure to limit or cease funding in the wake of state
violations of federal funding conditions serves to encourage con-
tinued noncompliance by the states.76
B. The Administrative Appeals Process
In addition to the requirement that states establish reasona-
ble and adequate reimbursement schemes, the Social Security
70. 42 C.F.R. 447.256(b) (1989). The Secretary has concluded that the Medicaid Act
does not require him to analyze or verify the state's findings, but only to satisfy himself
that there is a reasonable basis on which the states' assurances may be accepted. 48 Fed.
Reg. 56,046, 56,051 (1983). Testimony of an official at the Department of Health and
Human Services reveals that the accepted practice is not to "look behind" the assurances
given by any state. West Virginia Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey, 701 F. Supp. 496, 510 (M.D.
Pa. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989). See also Illinois Health
Care Ass'n v. Suter, 719 F. Supp. 1419, 1425 n.11 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
71. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 110 (C.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 705
F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1983).
72. See, e.g., Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1154 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980); Illinois
Health Care Ass'n v. Suter, 719 F. Supp. 1419, 1423-25 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
73. 42 C.F.R. § 430.35 (1990).
74. Leonard Weiser-Varon, Injunctive Relief from State Violations of Federal
Funding Conditions, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1242 (1982). See also Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 705 n.38 (1979).
75. Id. at 1242-43.
76. Id.
1992]
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Act also requires participating states to implement an appeals or
exception process by which providers may challenge their pay-
ment rates.7 The initial regulations mandated that state Medi-
caid agencies "provide an appeals procedure that allows individ-
ual providers an opportunity to . . . request prompt
administrative review of payment rates. '7 8
However, in 1983 the regulation was rewritten to reflect the
congressional desire to maximize states' discretion in Medicaid
program administration in an effort to encourage cost contain-
ment.79 The amended regulation only required an appeals proce-
dure for reimbursement rates "with respect to such issues as the
[state] agency determines appropriate."' 0 According to one
court, this "permissive language give[s] the [state] agency
greater authority to select issues for determination" and allows
it to "reject review of challenges to the validity of its methodol-
ogy in its administrative appeals system.""1 Thus, at this junc-
ture, a state may effectively insulate its reimbursement method-
ology from any substantial challenge. Accordingly, twenty-four
states currently limit challenges on appeal to the correction of
errors in calculation of rates, or to adjustment of rates due to a
provider's changed circumstances, such as extraordinary capital
expenditures.2 Also, twenty-three states expressly prohibit ap-
peals of some aspects of the rate-setting methodology. 3
State agencies are encouraged, but are not mandated by
federal regulation, to make retroactive payments to providers
when erroneous deprivation of an entitlement is established at
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(37)(B) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(c) (1990).
78. 46 Fed. Reg. 47,964 (1981).
79. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046, 56,052 (1983).
80. 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(c) (1990). Section 447.253 provides:
(c) Provider Appeals. The Medicaid agency must provide an appeals or exception
procedure that allows individual providers an opportunity to submit additional
evidence and receive prompt administrative review, with respect to such issues as
the agency determines appropriate, of payment rates.
Id.
81. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 31 (3d Cir. 1989). See also
Weiser-Varon, supra note 74, at 1243 (state agency hearings "unlikely to be useful for
review of ... general administrative practice .... ).
82. Brief Amicus Curiae of American Health Care Association at Appendix B-2,
Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
83. Id. at Appendix B-3.
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an administrative hearing.84 However, since the determinable is-
sues at such hearings may be limited by the states, 5 providers
are likely to receive reimbursement only for previous factual er-
rors, such as those made in the calculation of rates, and will be
deprived of retroactive payments for erroneous reimbursement
methodology or policies.8 6
C. Federal Court Adjudication - The Section 1983 Action
In addition to the administrative appeals process, the sec-
tion 1983 action provides an aggrieved health care provider with
an alternative forum to present the merits of its Medicaid reim-
bursement challenge.87 The Supreme Court has held that state
administrative procedures may be completely bypassed in favor
of federal court adjudication under section 1983.88 However,
Congress retains the authority to require the exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies as a prerequisite to commencement of a
section 1983 action.8 9
1. The Evolution of the Section 1983 Action
Section 1983 was originally enacted during the Reconstruc-
tion Era as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to redress south-
ern violence against African-Americans.90 Although application
of section 1983 initially focused on civil rights violations, the
section is now generally used to redress state deprivations of all
federally protected rights.91
Section 1983 provides a remedy for "the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws."" In Maine v. Thiboutot,93 the Supreme Court held that a
84. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,048, 56,052 (1983).
85. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
86. See Weiser-Varon, supra note 74, at 1252-53 n.93.
87. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
88. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
89. Id. at 513.
90. See Old Federalism, supra note 17, at 1007-09.
91. Id. at 1008-09.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
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section 1983 remedy is available for the denial of rights created
by federal statutes.9
4
However, in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority,95 the Supreme Court discussed two excep-
tions to the enforcement of section 1983 relief for claims of stat-
utory violations.9 First, the establishment of a comprehensive
and specific remedial scheme within a statute will be construed
as congressional intent to foreclose a section 1983 remedy.9 7
Second, for a section 1983 remedy to be available, the statute
must create "rights, privileges or immunities" enforceable by the
parties.9 A statutory right will accrue to a plaintiff if he "is one
of a class for whose special benefit a statute was enacted .... ,
Thus, a section 1983 challenge will be available to the intended
beneficiary of a statutory enactment who can prove that the
statute created absolute obligations for the state on his behalf.100
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,'10
the Supreme Court ruled that section 6010 of the Developmen-
tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, which
called for "appropriate treatment" for the developmentally dis-
abled "in the least restrictive environment," did not create a
substantive right to any specific level of care." 2 The Court, rely-
ing on the context of the statute, the legislative history, and the
fact that compliance with the provision was not a condition of
receipt of funding, found that Congress intended only to reveal a
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
Id.
93. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
94. Id. at 4.
95. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 423-24. For example, in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court found that the availability of non-compliance
orders, elaborate citizen-suit provisions, and criminal sanctions expressly established in
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act supplanted any remedy that would be available
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by creating a comprehensive, remedial alternative.
98. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423.
99. Coos Bay Care Ctr. v. State of Oregon, Dep't of Human Resources, 803 F.2d
1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated as moot, 484 U.S. 806 (1987).
100. Id.
101. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
102. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 12:139
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/4
WILDER
preference for appropriate treatment.'0 3 The Court concluded
that congressional "declarations of policy ... serve as a nudge in
the preferred direction" and do not give rise to an enforceable
right.'"" However, where the grant of federal funds is expressly
conditioned on a state's compliance with regulatory provisions,
and where the mandate is sufficiently specific that the state may
make an "informed choice" to participate, the state has accepted
a binding obligation enforceable under section 1983.105
Plaintiffs are generally not required to exhaust state judicial
remedies before asserting section 1983 claims in federal courts
because the cause of action is intended to supplement and not
replace state judicial remedies.'0 6 In fact, Congress declined to
adopt an exhaustion requirement for all section 1983 actions,
but rather may incorporate a limited exhaustion requirement
into specific statutory enactments.' 7
2. Limitations of the Section 1983 Action
Because the financial viability of many hospitals depends on
receipt of adequate Medicaid reimbursement payments,'0 8 recov-
ery of funds wrongfully withheld and state implementation of
complying rates are crucial to the facilities' continued exis-
tence.' 9 In response to the limited relief available through fed-
eral and state administrative agencies, plaintiffs are continu-
ously turning to the courts for a remedy by employing the
section 1983 action."10 One benefit of the section 1983 suit is that
once it has been properly authorized, attorney fees and expenses
may be awarded at the court's discretion to the prevailing par-
ties."' Yet, in many circumstances, the courts are unable to offer
103. Id. at 19.
104. Id. (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970)).
105. Id. at 24-25. See also Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479
U.S. 418 (1987) (holding that regulations adopted pursuant to the Brooke Amendment to
the Housing Act, specifying rent ceilings, were sufficiently definite to qualify as an en-
forceable right under § 1983).
106. See Old Federalism, supra note 17, at 1018-20; Patsy v. Board of Regents of
Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 506 (1982).
107. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 502-12.
108. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
1109. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
110. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Section 1988 provides in relevant part:
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deprived beneficiaries a full range of remedial relief. 112
a. The Eleventh Amendment Bar to Retroactive
Relief
The health care provider, deprived of funds wrongfully
withheld due to statutory noncompliance with federal condi-
tions, is barred by the eleventh amendment from obtaining ret-
roactive reimbursement.'13 Although the amendment appears on
its face to bar only those suits against one state that are brought
by citizens of another, it has "consistently" been construed by
the Supreme Court as barring suits against a state brought by its
own citizens as well.' 1 4
In Edelman v. Jordan,1" 5 the Supreme Court held that pur-
suant to the eleventh amendment a federal court is not author-
ized to award retroactive monetary relief for a prior "breach of
legal duty ...by state officials.""' 6 However, the Court found
that awards of prospective relief are exempt from the eleventh
amendment bar because such fiscal consequences to state trea-
suries are the incidental, yet necessary result of continued pro-
gram compliance.' 1 7
The Edelman holding is applicable only to suits instituted
In any action or proceeding to enforce ... section ... 1983 .... the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reason-
able attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in West Virginia Univ. Hosp. Ass'n v. Casey, 885
F.2d 11, 32 (3d Cir. 1989), found that expert witness fees may be included in such an
award even though the fees may be extremely costly due to the extraordinary data com-
pilation and analysis entailed in a typical Medicaid reimbursement rate challenge. See
also Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1985); Owen
M. Field, The Application of Section 1983 to the Violation of Federal Statutory
Rights - Maine v. Thiboutot, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 651, (1981).
112. See Weiser-Varon, supra note 74, at 1250.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment provides:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
Id. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v.
Suter, 719 F. Supp. 1419, 1426 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Worthington Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Creasy, 4 Ohio App. 3d 92, 98 (1982).
114. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 668.
117. Id.
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in federal courts.1 8 Providers seeking retroactive reimbursement
may pursue compensation in state courts for benefits wrongfully
withheld.119 However, many states, concerned with protecting
state treasuries, bar retroactive relief by applying the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to preclude state court adjudication of cases
alleging state liability.'2 0 Thus, because beneficiaries in many
states may be unable to obtain retroactive reimbursement at the
state or federal level, the limited remedies available under the
section 1983 cause of action will perpetuate the irretrievable
losses to grant-in-aid program beneficiaries.' 1
b. Availability and Effectiveness of Prospective
Remedies
Because of a federal court's inability to grant retroactive re-
lief, the federal grant of prospective relief becomes more signifi-
cant."'2 The courts typically respond to state noncompliance
with federal regulations in three distinct ways. 12 3 First, a federal
court may order an injunction terminating the state's use of fed-
eral funds.'"4 However, like the fund-termination authority
granted to the Secretary by Congress, this form of relief ulti-
mately will harm the beneficiaries of the program that the fund-
ing was designed to assist.' 5 Second, the courts may delay ter-
mination of funding by granting the state an adequate
opportunity to amend or correct its violative practices.' 6 This
approach comports with the Congressional desire to allow states
to rely on their own discretion in administering their Medicaid
programs within the broad federal guidelines.' 7 This delay gives
the states an extension of time to comply with the order during
118. See Weiser-Varon, supra note 74, at 1253.
119. Id. at 1254.
120. Id. at 1254-56.
121. Id. at 1260.
122. Id. at 1262-63. See also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Illinois Health
Care Ass'n v. Suter, 719 F.Supp. 1419, 1426 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
123. Weiser-Varon, supra note 74, at 1263.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1264. See also West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 35 (3d
Cir. 1989)(directing defendant to formulate a complying reimbursement methodology
within 90 days).
127. Weiser-Varon, supra note 74, at 1274.
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which they are not enjoined from using federal funds nor re-
quired to comply with funding conditions. 12 8 Thus, the intended
beneficiaries of the statutory framework will continue to suffer
by being denied their legal entitlements for an additional period
of time.
The third prospective relief option is to grant an injunction
ordering immediate compliance with federal conditions.'29 This
alternative avoids any continued deprivation caused by the use
of noncomplying reimbursement rates. Yet, an injunction man-
dating a state to implement a particular practice or policy cho-
sen by the court interferes with both the Congressional scheme
that delegated rate-making authority to the states and the in-
tended federal/state balance of power. 130
c. Encouragement of Forum Splitting
Health care providers seeking federal injunctive relief to bar
the use of a state's noncomplying reimbursement rates may
choose to file subsequent state court claims to obtain retrospec-
tive compensation if the state has waived its right to sovereign
immunity."3 ' Thus, time-consuming and costly forum-splitting
or piecemeal litigation may provide the only means possible
under current law to obtain both a federal court adjudication of
noncompliance issues and restitution of benefits unreasonably
withheld.3 2
Providers are free to seek both prospective and retrospec-
tive relief in state courts. Yet, most beneficiary suits are adjudi-
cated in federal forums 33 to avoid the feared prejudice associ-
ated with the state court system. Such adjudication of federal
funding violations is favored because of the federal courts' abil-
ity to provide uniformity of interpretation of federal require-
ments, which state courts are unable to offer.13  Federal courts
128. Id. at 1264.
129. Id. at 1265. See Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 719 F. Supp. 1173, 1183
(S.D.N.Y. 1989)(defendants ordered to employ specific reimbursement adjustment
factor).
130. Weiser-Varon, supra note 74, at 1269.
131. Id. at 1254-55. See also supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
132. Weiser-Varon, supra note 74, at 1254.
133. Id. at 1253-54.
134. Id. at 1253 n.98.
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may more adequately safeguard the federal government's inter-
est in monitoring federal expenditures and may have greater ex-
pertise in interpretation and enforcement of complex federal
statutes and regulations.13"
3. Conflict Among the Lower Courts
Medicaid reimbursement rate challenges initiated in the
state and federal courts have resulted at times in inconsistent
rulings and have failed to provide a clear articulation of the ap-
propriate analysis in a section 1983 action. In considering
whether the health care provider is the intended beneficiary of
the Boren Amendment, some courts have held that individual
Medicaid patients are the only intended beneficiaries of the pro-
visions and that providers therefore do not have a claim under
section 1983.136 One court has insisted that health care providers
are merely the "instruments" through which Congress channels
aid to the real beneficiaries of the program. 37
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have found that Medicaid
patients and providers have "parallel interests" in the Medicaid
legislation and thus both may institute a section 1983 chal-
lenge.1 8 However, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia has expressly rejected the notion of "par-
allel interests" advanced by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,
finding rather that "recipients and providers are each invested
with certain specific enforceable rights ....
The federal District Court for the Western District of Wis-
135. Id.
136. Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (11th Cir. 1986); Ohio Academy of
Nursing Homes v. Barry, No. 88AP-826, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2482 (Jun. 22.
1989)(holding that providers' interests do not rise to the level of a right since nothing in
the statute shows a congressional intent to confer benefits on providers for their own
sake) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 56 Ohio St.3d 120, 564 N.E.2d 686 (Ohio 1990) (On
appeal, the court reversed, finding that providers do have a substantive right to reasona-
ble and adequate rates in light of the decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110
S.Ct. 2510 (1990)).
137. Ohio Academy, No. 88AP-826, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2482, at *9 (June 22,
1989).
138. Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 842 F.2d 1158,
1164 n.5 (10th Cir. 1988); Coos Bay Care Ctr. v. Oregon Dep't of Human Resources, 803
F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 484 U.S. 806 (1987).
139. Vantage Healthcare Corp. v. Virginia Bd. of Medical Assistance Servs., 684 F.
Supp. 1329, 1333 (E.D. Va. 1988).
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consin has found that although a private right of action pursu-
ant to section 1983 was available in provider challenges to Medi-
caid reimbursement methodology, the federal court should
abstain from granting relief.140 Abstention was justified by this
court because substantial rate-making discretion was conferred
upon the states and because the issues were considered predomi-
nantly local.141
A number of courts have found that the provider is the in-
tended beneficiary of the Medicaid Act and accordingly have ad-
dressed the merits of the section 1983 reimbursement rate chal-
lenge. 42  These courts have consistently refrained from
substituting their own judgement for that of the agency by ap-
plying a deferential standard of review, 43 and by attaching a
presumption of validity to such state agency action.' Conse-
quently, state implemented rates were invalidated only on a
finding of arbitrary and capricious state action "5 or for abuse of
the state's discretion.' 6
IV. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association
A. The Facts
In response to the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act,
Virginia adopted a prospective reimbursement system, effective
July 1, 1982.1" The new program categorized hospitals by "peer
groups" based on number of beds and facility location, and set
ceiling reimbursement rates for each peer group. " Initial ceiling
rates were calculated based on actual cost data for the 1981 base
year, to be adjusted by a "reimbursement escalator" on an an-
140. Saint Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters v. Thompson, 725 F. Supp. 1038
(W.D. Wisc. 1989).
141. Id.
142. See Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063 (1987). See also Mississippi Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 701 F.2d
511 (5th Cir. 1983).
143. Mississippi Hosp. Ass'n, 701 F.2d at 516; Friedman v. Perales, 668 F. Supp.
216, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
144. West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1989).
145. Id.
146. Friedman, 668 F. Supp. at 221.
147. Mary Washington Hosp. v. Fisher, 635 F. Supp. 891, 895 (E.D. Va. 1985).
148. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2514 (1990).
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nual basis. 4 9 Virginia relied on the national Consumer Price In-
dex ("CPI") as its reimbursement escalator.'
Virginia Hospital Association ("VHA") is a nonprofit associ-
ation of public and private Virginia hospitals established to re-
present the interests of its members.' In 1986, VHA instituted
an action against the Governor and other Virginia officials. claim-
ing that Virginia's Medicaid reimbursement procedures violated
the requirements of the Medicaid Act. 52 Specifically, VHA
charged that (1) the reimbursement rates under Virginia's plan
did not "reasonably and adequately meet the costs incurred by
efficiently and economically operated hospitals;" (2) the "reim-
bursement escalator" linked to the CPI would lead to inade-
quate future rates; and (3) Virginia's appeals procedures for in-
dividual hospitals were inadequate." 3 VHA sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, including an order that Virginia promul-
gate a new state plan and corresponding new rates, as well as
reimbursement in the interim period at rates commensurate
with payments under the Medicare program.154
B. Procedural History
1. The District Court Decisions
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia granted summary judgment in the State's favor, finding
that VHA was collaterally estopped from litigating those issues
which had previously been decided 55 in Mary Washington Hos-
pital, Inc. v. Fisher.56 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded, finding that collateral estoppel was
not applicable against VHA, which was not a party to the previ-
ous case and did not have an opportunity to litigate.1 57 Further-
more, by the time of VHA's suit, Virginia had since promulgated
a new appeals mechanism, and employed a different reimburse-
149. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 830 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987).
150. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2514 n.3.
151. Id. at 2514.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2514 n.3.
154. Id. at 2514-15.
155. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 868 F.2d 653, 656 (4th Cir. 1989).
156. 635 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1985).
157. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 830 F.2d 1308, 1313 (4th Cir. 1987).
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ment escalator, both of which were at issue in the subsequent
litigation. '58 On remand, the district court denied the State's
motion for summary judgment which was predicated on several
theories of nonjusticiability, including a claim that the Medicaid
Act does not create a right actionable under section 1983 for
health care providers. 15 9
2. The Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal from denial of the State's motion for summary
judgment, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that VHA could
challenge Virginia's reimbursement procedures under section
1983 because health care providers are intended beneficiaries of
the reimbursement provisions of the Medicaid Act, and because
Virginia failed to establish a congressional intent to foreclose
such enforcement.16 ° The court acknowledged the State's con-
cern that a section 1983 action "may lead to crushing financial
burdens that participating states could not have foreseen when
they elected to participate in the Medicaid program." 6 ' How-
ever, the court reasoned that finding a cause of action in favor of
plaintiff-providers would be the only reading of the provisions
that "protects the balance for which Congress has striven be-
tween ensuring health care to the poorest citizens and imposing
a manageable burden on . . . state treasuries." ' 2
The court of appeals also determined that the suit against
Virginia officials was not barred by eleventh amendment immu-
nity for suits that charge state officials with violations of federal
law, even though a "substantial ancillary effect on the state trea-
sury" might result from this grant of prospective relief.16 3 Be-
cause the Medicaid program is both a federal and a state con-
cern, the court also denied the state's claim under Burford v.
Sun Oil Co. 1 4 that the district court should have abstained from
158. Virginia Hosp., 868 F.2d at 661-62.
159. Id. at 656.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 659.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 662 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986)).
164. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). In Burford, the Court found that it was proper for a fed-
eral court to abstain from deciding a matter of substantial state concern where the state
maintained a comprehensive regulatory scheme, where uniform decision-making in the
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deciding the issue.165
3. The Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
view this section 1983 claim of health care providers.16 6 Thereaf-
ter, in a five-to-four decision written by Justice Brennan, the
Court adhered to the reasoning employed in both Pennhurst6 7
and Wright,' and concluded that the Boren Amendment im-
poses an obligation to adopt "reasonable and adequate" rates
that is binding on state Medicaid agencies and enforceable
under section 1983.169 In affirming the decision of the court of
appeals,1 70 the Supreme Court ruled that providers were not
merely entitled to enforce a state's procedural compliance with
the Boren Amendment, but found, rather, that "the Act pro-
vides a substantive right to reasonable and adequate rates as
well.",171
Using the two-step analysis employed in Wright, the Court
first inquired whether the Boren Amendment created a "federal
right" that was "intended to benefit the putative plaintiff."' 72
The Court determined that there was "little doubt" that provid-
ers are the "intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment"
because the amendment established a system for reimbursement
of health care providers. 173
The Court determined that a federal right was created in
favor of health care providers to obtain reasonable and adequate
reimbursement because the Boren Amendment is cast in
"mandatory rather than precatory" terms. 74 The majority rea-
specific area was needed, and where intervention by the lower federal courts would cause
the type of nonuniformity that the state regulatory system was designed to avoid. Id. at
327-34.
165. Virginia Hosp., 868 F.2d at 664.
166. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989).
167. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
168. 479 U.S. 418 (1987). See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
169. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1990).
170. Id. at 2525.
171. Id. at 2517 (emphasis added).
172. Id. (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444, 448
(1989)).
173. Id. at 2517.
174. Id. at 2519.
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soned that such a right must have been intended because the
Boren Amendment explicitly states that the state plan "must
provide for payment of hospitals' 17' and because the grant of
federal funds is expressly conditioned on compliance with the
terms of the Medicaid Act's state plan provisions.171
The Wilder Court rejected Virginia's claims that the broad
discretion given to states to implement reimbursement rates im-
posed an obligation that was "too vague and amorphous" to be
judicially enforceable.17 7 Rather, the Court noted that in deter-
mining the appropriate judicial standard of review, the courts
should consider the fact that the states have the authority to set
rates within their broad discretion.1 78
The second part of the Court's analysis focused on the
State's claims that Congress had foreclosed enforcement of the
Medicaid Act under section 1983 by the establishment of an ad-
ministrative appeals procedure and by granting the Secretary
authority to audit noncomplying state plans. 79 Citing the stan-
dard promulgated in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Ass'n, 80 the Court found that the Medi-
caid Act did not contain adequate provisions for private judicial
or administrative enforcement.' 81 Although states are required
to adopt an appeals process by which individual providers may
obtain administrative review of reimbursement rates, the Court
found that this avenue of review was insufficient to foreclose a
section 1983 remedy because the states may, in their discretion,
limit appealable issues to those that they deem appropriate.'82
Specifically, the Court found that Virginia's administrative
appeals process excluded the following issues from appeal: "(1)
the organization of peer groups; (2) the use of the reimburse-
ment rates established in the plan; (3) the calculation of the ini-
tial group ceilings as of 1982; (4) the use of the consumer price
175. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)(emphasis
added)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2522.
178. Id. at 2523.
179. Id. at 2523-25.
180. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
181. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2524.
182. Id.
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index; and (5) the time limits set forth in the state plan [for
appeal]." 183 Thus, the Court found that VHA would have been
unable to challenge Virginia's reimbursement methodology if
forced to rely on the state-implemented appeals process as an
avenue of review.1 8' The Court also determined that the Secre-
tary's limited oversight, including the authority to audit state-
submitted plans, was insufficient to constitute an alternative
remedy that would foreclose a section 1983 suit.1 85 In the ab-
sence of a comprehensive remedial scheme, the Court found no
congressional intent to foreclose health care providers from the
relief available under section 1983.186
Although the Court declined to articulate specific guidelines
for review, it acknowledged the application of a deferential stan-
dard as generally applied by the courts of appeals. 187 The Court
also noted that there will be a "range of reasonable rates" be-
yond which no court could find compliance with the Medicaid
regulations.88
4. The Dissenting Opinion
Speaking for the dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist sharply
objected to the majority's holding that health care providers
have an enforceable substantive right under section 1983.189 The
dissent argued that the only enforceable right guaranteed by the
statute is that the state Medicaid agencies comply with the bare
procedural requirements set forth in the Medicaid Act.' 90
Relying on a plain reading of the statute's text, Rehnquist
contended that Congress had not conferred any identifiable, en-
forceable rights on Medicaid service providers; rather, it had
merely established one of many conditions for the receipt of
funds.' 9' In the absence of an express "focus" on providers as
beneficiaries, there is no dispositive evidence of Congress' intent
183. Id. at 2525 n.20.
184. Id. at 2524-25.
185. Id. at 2524.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2523 n.18.
188. Id. at 2523.
189. Id. at 2525-27.
190. Id. at 2526-27.
191. Id. at 2526.
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to create rights in favor of that class.'92
Furthermore, the dissent contended that the Medicaid Act
establishes a two-step, congressionally mandated procedure for
setting reimbursement rates which first requires the states to
make findings and then requires states to make assurances to be
reviewed by the Secretary, and not the courts.'93 The dissent
concluded that a provider may bring a section 1983 action only
to compel compliance with that procedure."" Finally, the dissent
forecast that, under the majority's holding, Medicaid providers
may bring section 1983 actions to "avoid the process rather than
to seek its implementation."'9 8 Thus, the dissent noted that suc-
cessful provider-plaintiffs seeking to enjoin and substitute state-
implemented rates cause the displacement of rates determined
by states pursuant to the statutory mandate, undermine the dis-
cretionary authority granted to the states by the Boren Amend-
ment, and circumvent the congressionally established remedial
schemes.'19
V. Implications of the Wilder Decision
A. An Explosion of Litigation and Devastating Expenses
The Wilder Court's endorsement of the section 1983 suit as
a remedy for state noncompliance with the federal Medicaid
program threatens to cause an explosion of litigation in the fed-
eral courts.' 9 In fact, expansive application of the section 1983
remedy to all grant-in-aid programs would potentially expose
over 700 existing cooperative federal-state programs to costly
federal litigation'98 and unintended supervision. 99 A critic of us-
192. Id. at 2527.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. See Note, supra note 17, at 1019.
198. Richard B. Capalli, Federal Grants and the New Statutory Tort: State and
Local Officials Beware!, 12 URB. LAW. 445, 446 (1980). See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, 22 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that "literally hundreds of cooperative
regulatory and social welfare enactments may be affected"). See generally David C.
Frederick, Comprehensive Remedies and Statutory Section 1983 Actions: Context as a
Guide to Procedural Fairness, 67 TEx. L. REV. 627 (1989).
199. See infra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
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ing the section 1983 remedy for Medicaid program violations
claims that "year-by-year, provider-by-provider" litigation over
each provision of each state's regulations will become common-
place, in derogation of Congress' clear intent to reduce federal
oversight of the reimbursement rate process. °0
Many states have already been forced to defend their reim-
bursement policies repeatedly in the federal judicial forum.2 0 1
Accordingly, it is likely that the routine rate challenge will be
transformed unnecessarily into a federal case.20 2 Since millions
of state and federal dollars are potentially at stake in each law-
suit,20 3 the defense of multiple claims can be devastating on gov-
ernment treasuries.
Although one purpose of the Boren Amendment was to de-
crease the expense previously associated with the extensive re-
porting requirements,20 4 the increased litigation likely to result
from the encouragement of section 1983 suits will most certainly
create an explosion of paperwork that is at least as oppressive.20 5
The state and federal governments are now being exposed to
considerable financial burdens in defense of section 1983 claims
despite the fact that a major policy objective of the Boren
Amendment was to contain government costs. 20 6
Increasingly scarce resources are being diverted from Medi-
caid programs to litigation. 207 Unfortunately, any cost savings
200. Brief Amicus Curiae for Alaska at 4,5, Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S.
Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043) (noting that it is "distinctly ironic" that a congressional
intent to eliminate burdensome federal oversight "has become the impetus for a mount-
ing tide of litigation and potential liability").
201. As soon as Mary Washington Hosp. v. Fisher, 635 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1985),
was adjudicated, VHA filed its claim. While VHA's claim was pending, Vantage Health-
care Corp. v. Virginia Bd. of Medical Assistance Servs., 684 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Va.
1988), was decided. Pennsylvania was forced to defend five separate reimbursement rate
challenges simultaneously. Brief for Gerald L. Baliles at 25 n.18 Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510
(1990) (No. 88-2043).
202. Brief Amicus Curiae for Alaska at iv, Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-
2043).
203. Brief Amicus Curiae for United States at 21, Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990)
(No. 88-2043).
204. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046 (1983).
205. Brief Amicus Curiae for California Ass'n of Hosp. and Health Sys. at 28 n.13,
Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
206. Brief Amicus Curiae for National Governors' Ass'n at 2, Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510
(1990) (No. 88-2043).
207. See George D. Brown, Whither Thiboutot? Section 1983, Private Enforcement
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realized as a result of the Boren Amendment's underlying cost
containment policies will be spent on reimbursement rate litiga-
tion, rather than on improving access to and quality of medical
services for the nation's poor."0 8 This result could not have been
envisioned or accepted by a Congress devoted to securing "qual-
ity care for the poor."20 9
Commentators have urged that an increased caseload in the
federal courts is not a sufficient reason to deny grant benefi-
ciaries the same protection afforded other holders of federal
rights.210 However, when the costs of increased litigation begin
to threaten the availability of state and federal funds, which
otherwise could be used to increase the quality of health care
services available to the poor, an increase in caseload does be-
come a significant concern. The authorized awards of attorneys'
fees and costs further divert financial resources from the very
needs Congress intended to address by adoption of the grant-in-
aid program.211
B. The Section 1983 Remedy Allows Providers to Avoid Inten-
tionally Limited Remedial Schemes
Through the Boren Amendment, Congress intentionally
limited federal oversight of the rate-setting process by reducing
federal administrative supervision to a level "adequate to ensure
proper accountability." '212 Yet, the Wilder Court's endorsement
of reimbursement rate litigation in the federal courts contradicts
Congress' express intent to keep federal oversight to a mini-
mum."2 '3 Thus, plaintiffs may employ the section 1983 action to
avoid remedial schemes purposefully limited by Congress and
may thereby undermine congressional intent.1
and the Damages Dilemma, 33 DE PAUL L. REv. 31, 40 (1983).
208. Brief Amicus Curiae for United States at 3, Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No.
88-2043).
209. S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 744.
210. See Old Federalism, supra note 17, at 1020.
211. See Brown, supra note 207, at 40.
212. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
213. See Brief Amicus Curiae of United States at 10-11, Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Ass'n, 110 S.Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
214. See Frederick, supra note 198, at 646.
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Application of section 1983 may disrupt administrative ap-
peals and enforcement procedures that have been authorized by
the Medicaid statute.21 The result may be a circumvention of
the administrative authority that Congress often regards as a
critical element in a regulatory scheme.2 16 This circumvention
results because exhaustion of state administrative remedies is
not a prerequisite for bringing a section 1983 claim.2"
A dual system of review is created because the federal
courts and administrative agencies are engaging in often dupli-
cative functions. Simultaneous enforcement of the section 1983
action and state appeals procedures creates an overlapping re-
view system that was not intended by Congress, and that may
disrupt the states' ability to administer their Medicaid programs
effectively. 1 8 Under the system endorsed by the Wilder major-
ity, states' costs will be compounded because they will remain
obligated, by federal regulation, to fund an administrative ap-
peals procedure 21 1 only to find that it frequently may be by-
passed by providers who have been authorized to proceed di-
rectly to the federal courts.2 0
C. The Grant of a Section 1983 Remedy is Not Meaningful
Because health care providers rely so heavily for financial
viability on reimbursement revenues from third party payers
such as Medicaid, and because the Boren Amendment to the
Medicaid Act deals directly with the calculation of those rates,
there is strength in the majority's finding that providers are the
intended beneficiaries of the Act with corresponding rights.
However, while the Court has confirmed the availability to
health care providers of a section 1983 claim, it is clear that
these plaintiffs have not yet won the right to a plenary review of
215. Id.
216. Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law,
49 U. CHI. L. REv. 394 (1982).
217. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
218. Petition for writ of certiorari at 8, Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct.
2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
219. Id. at 29.
220. Brief Amicus Curiae of United States at 2, Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No.
88-2043); Brief Anicus Curiae for National Governors' Ass'n at 25, Wilder, 110 S. Ct.
2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
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state reimbursement methodology. The deferential standard of
review, and the limited remedies available even to the successful
plaintiff, render the section 1983 action an ineffective means of
safeguarding the federal interest in proper expenditure of funds
and protection of the nation's elderly and poor.2 21
The Wilder Court has found that the Secretary's adminis-
trative oversight has been intentionally limited by Congress to
the approval of state-submitted assurances of the reasonableness
and adequacy of its rates.222 In this capacity, the Secretary is
currently not required to review the actual data used by the
states to arrive at their reimbursement rates and methodol-
ogy.223 Thus, the state reimbursement plan is not, at this junc-
ture, subject to meaningful scrutiny.
The Wilder Court also found that this avenue does not
guarantee a comprehensive review of reimbursement rates, be-
cause the mandatory appeals process for review of reimburse-
ment rates is restricted to issues that the state finds "appropri-
ate."224 As the Court noted, the Virginia Medicaid agency, as is
typical of many state Medicaid agencies, has opted not to allow
as an issue for review the means of calculation or application of
its rates.225 Thus, it has effectively insulated its reimbursement
methodology from any substantial challenge.22
In light of the inadequacies presently inherent in the ad-
ministrative appeals process and the Secretary's oversight, ac-
cess to the federal courts pursuant to section 1983 may, at first
glance, appear to be the providers' only avenue to obtain ade-
quate review. However, the providers still will not be afforded a
meaningful review of state-implemented reimbursement rates.
According to the Supreme Court in Wilder, the courts will
merely employ a deferential standard of review of reimburse-
ment rates in recognition of the broad discretion bestowed upon
the states by Congress in the Boren Amendment. 227 The Court
failed to articulate specific guidelines for judicial review of state
221. See supra notes 113-135 and accompanying text.
222. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2521.
223. Id. at 2520.
224. Id. at 2525.
225. Id. at 2524-25.
226. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 179, 188-89 and accompanying text.
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rates, concluding rather that the courts were competent to calcu-
late a "range of reasonable rates."22 8 Accordingly, states would
be enjoined from implementing their proposed rates only if they
were found to be unreasonable or arbitrary - beyond what
might be reasonably calculated within the parameters of their
broad discretion.
Although state reimbursement rates might generally be con-
sidered reasonable, an individual provider whose costs, due to
some special circumstances, are not adequately covered by those
rates will find this level of review inadequate.2 29 This is espe-
cially true for public or inner-city hospitals that treat a dispro-
portionate number of Medicaid patients.230
The section 1983 action cannot offer aggrieved health care
providers a prompt remedy,2 31 and often cannot provide com-
pensation for past benefits wrongfully withheld.2 32 In light of the
limited remedies available to the section 1983 complainant, the
extreme costs of the suit are not justified. Yet, because the alter-
native administrative schemes provide ineffective relief for viola-
tions of federal funding conditions, the volume of federal suits is
likely to be high, for lack of a better option.
D. State and Federal Administrative Forums Favored
Commentators agree that review of state implemented reim-
bursement rates is best accomplished at the federal and state
administrative levels rather than by the federal judiciary.2 33
Such challenges often require courts to make determinations for
which they lack expertise and fact-finding ability in comparison
with the established agency.2 34
Congress specifically delegated oversight of grant programs
to federal agencies with expertise in specific program adminis-
228. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2523.
229. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
231. See Sunstein, supra note 216, at 416-17.
232. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
233. See Old Federalism, supra note 17, at 1013. See also Sunstein, supra note 216,
at 428; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 (1970) (because of its expertise, HEW better
suited than the courts to review alleged inconsistency between federal statute and state
scheme).
234. Sunstein, supra note 216, at 416.
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tration because they are better able to respond to changes in
regional conditions and to apply uniform standards. 36 Conse-
quently, these agencies have been established to supplant the
courts as an avenue for review of regulations.236
Even under the more burdensome pre-Boren provisions,237
supervision of the state rate-setting process by the Secretary
would have caused less delay and disruption in the administra-
tion of Medicaid than will result from federal litigation. 238 The
Boren Amendment does envision hospital challenges of "arbi-
trary and capricious" reimbursement rates.2 9 However, because
Congress has delegated authority to the Secretary to determine
if state payment systems are satisfactory, the Secretary should
be responsible for detecting unreasonable state action.24 0 Ade-
quate review could thus be accomplished at an earlier, preven-
tive stage by the Secretary before state plans are approved.
Similarly, the state administrative agencies are particularly
well-suited to determine whether rates are reasonable. The state
Medicaid agency deals on a daily basis with the intricacies of the
grant-in-aid program and its beneficiaries, and is able to review
and assess the local needs of individual providers more read-
ily.24 1 Again, reimbursement challenges may be resolved by ex-
penditure of fewer scarce resources at the state administrative
level than by costly section 1983 actions.24 2
E. The Current Scheme of Review Contravenes Congressional
Intent
Where a statutory framework "exudes deference" to an ad-
ministrative agency, the Supreme Court has found that the lan-
guage precludes any meaningful standard of review by the courts
235. Id.
236. Id. at 429.
237. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
238. Brief Amicus Curiae for Alaska at 7, Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct.
2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
239. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,048, 56,052 (1983).
240. See Reply Brief for Gerald L. Baliles at 8-9, Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No.
88-2043).
241. Brief Amicus Curiae for United States at 15, Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990)
(No. 88-2043).
242. Brief Amicus Curiae for National Governors' Ass'n at 29, Wilder, 110 S. Ct.
2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
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because implementation has been committed by Congress to
agency discretion., 3 Congress may decline to elaborate the de-
tails of agency compliance and may choose rather to incorporate
a standard of "reasonableness" into a statute. "4 Commentators
interpret the "reasonableness" standard to be a broad grant of
authority to administrative agencies based on congressional in-
tent and recognition that the agencies specialize in a particular
area and may have expertise in balancing factors relevant to pol-
icy-making.24 5
Furthermore, unlike the courts, administrative agencies may
be subject to political influences which affect the agencies' en-
forcement of an ambiguous "reasonableness" standard.246 Al-
though the agency administering the statutory scheme may have
a different political agenda than that of the Congress enacting
the statute, the broad grant of authority to the agencies effec-
tively sanctifies their enforcement of the regulations in response
to perceived political pressures. The courts, however, may en-
force a statute against classes of defendants that Congress pur-
posefully insulated from federal monitoring."" Thus, the use of
judicial remedies, such as the section 1983 action, may subse-
quently alter the political balance intended by Congress to be
achieved by administrative review.24 "
In addition, in enacting the Boren Amendment, Congress
specifically sought to avoid two evils that it envisioned might
result from the broad grant of discretion in state rate-setting.
First, Congress expressly cautioned that cost-containment ef-
forts should not "result in arbitrary and unduly low reimburse-
ment levels for hospital services."' 49 Second, Congress warned
that payment reductions that adversely affect the quality of care
for the needy would not be tolerated.15
Unfortunately, both evils have resulted in the wake of fed-
243. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 596 (1988).
244. See Sunstein, supra note 216 at 428.
245. See, e.g., id. at 428-30.
246. See Raup, supra note 3, at 1394 (stating that the price that a state Medicaid
program will pay for health services is set by a political force, not by the market). See
also Sunstein, supra note 216, at 429.
247. See Sunstein, supra note 216, at 418.
248. Id.
249. H.R. REP. No. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 293-94 (1981).
250. S. REP. No. 139, supra note 210, at 478, reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 744.
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eral budget cuts that have financially overburdened the Medi-
caid program.2 51 Not only has Congress' intent in enacting the
Boren Amendment been thwarted,252 the legislative purpose of
the entire Medicaid Act has been contravened. The Medicaid
program was designed to provide adequate medical care, includ-
ing sufficient access to services, to those classes of recipients
deemed "in need" by Congress. Yet, in enforcing the Boren
Amendment through the federal courts, and specifically by the
section 1983 action endorsed by the Wilder Court, scarce funds
are being diverted from achievement of the goal of care for the
needy to defense of challenges which could be adequately ad-
dressed in alternative and less costly administrative forums.
While health care providers should be encouraged to par-
ticipate in the Medicaid program, they are instead being driven
away through inadequate reimbursement rates.2 5 Moreover, the
potential defense of repeated section 1983 claims will deter par-
ticipation in grant programs in contravention of congressional
intent to offer an adequate range of needed services to the
poor. 254
F. A Proposed Alternative Remedy
Congress' goal of providing adequate health care to the
needy is being jeopardized by the Wilder Court's expansion of
the section 1983 action - a remedy that is not practical in light
of the growing number of indigent patients who are unable to
obtain adequate health services. 2 55 Because the Court's decision
promises an explosion of unproductive and costly litigation that
cannot adequately address the needs of aggrieved health care
providers or Medicaid recipients,258 the issue is now ripe for leg-
islative resolution.
Although Congress has intentionally reduced the Secretary's
oversight role in the cooperative Medicaid program scheme, its
intent that the Secretary review state assurances to "ensure
251. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
254. See Brow'n, supra note 207, at 40.
255. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 202-12 and accompanying text.
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proper accountability" 5 ' cannot be ignored. To ensure that the
Secretary's role is not reduced to that of a mere "rubber
stamp,' '258 especially where he has accumulated useful knowl-
edge and expertise, Congress should first amend the Medicaid
Act to include a "look-behind" provision.159 Such a provision
would require the Secretary to review or look behind the actual
findings upon which the states' assurances are based, rather
than to blindly accept state assurances of reasonableness of rates
on their face. This measure would prevent arbitrary reimburse-
ment plans from ever being implemented, and thus would re-
duce costs associated with the retrieval of entitlements improp-
erly withheld. The Secretary should employ the funding
termination powers granted by Congress to encourage state com-
pliance with funding conditions. The early assessment of state
reimbursement plans, coupled with the real threat of fund ter-
mination by the Secretary, would reduce the need for providers
to institute costly court challenges against rate-making agencies.
Next, provider appeal regulations implemented by the
HCFA 160 should be revised so that state administrative agencies
may not limit the issues determinable on appeal. ' Consistent
with congressional intent, such an amendment would not in-
fringe on the agency's discretion to develop rates, and would of-
fer providers a more meaningful forum for rate review at a sig-
nificantly reduced cost to all parties. The state agency is also not
restricted in its ability to compensate for any benefits wrongfully
withheld,2 62 and thus may offer providers a retrospective remedy
which is not available through the courts.263 Through these two
revisions, both prospective and retrospective relief may be
granted. The overburdened courts would experience much
257. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046, 56,047 (1983).
258. Brief Amicus Curiae for Connecticut at 15, Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110
S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
259. See supra note 70. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(33)(B) (1988).
260. 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(c) (1990).
261. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
262. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046, 56,052 (1983). Although no prescriptive Federal require-
ment exists for retroactive or prospective adjustments, "the intent behind the Federal
appeals provision is to provide a means for facilities to seek reimbursement relief upon a
proper finding by the State agency .... [Flair and reasonable rate adjustments are im-
plicit in an appeals process .... Id.
263. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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needed relief as well.
The HCFA has declined to develop national standards and
definitions for the terms used in the statutory language of the
Boren Amendment, such as "reasonable and adequate" rates
and "efficiently and economically operated facilities."2" Rather,
the HCFA has reasoned that the states are better able to estab-
lish methods and standards because they are "more informed of
individual providers' circumstances and they can be more re-
sponsive to individual needs when dealing with a limited num-
ber of providers than the federal agency."2 65 Under this same
reasoning, the state administrative agencies would be better
suited than any other entity, including the Secretary and the
federal courts, to review challenges by providers to state-imple-
mented reimbursement rates.
After revising the role of the Secretary and the administra-
tive appeals process, Congress should then incorporate an "ex-
haustion clause"266 into the Medicaid statute. An exhaustion
clause is a legislative option available when statutory schemes
are fully capable of providing the relief sought by a benefi:-
ciary. 21 7 In the related context of Medicare, for example, the Su-
preme Court has found that dissatisfied program beneficiaries
must avail themselves of all administrative remedies before they
are authorized to enter federal court.26 8 Exhaustion is required
when Congress finds that the potential for premature judicial in-
tervention in the administrative process outweighs the hardship
to beneficiaries caused by delays in the administrative process.26 9
Accordingly, an exhaustion provision would safeguard against
the extensive burden placed on the parties and the courts when
section 1983 actions are given broad application.
Finally, as a protection against wrongful state action, the
section 1983 action should be reserved for plaintiffs who have
exhausted administrative remedies but who believe the adminis-
trative resolution has been inadequate.2 70 The proposed reme-
264. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046, 56,048 (1983).
265. Id.
266. See Old Federalism, supra note 17, at 1018-20.
267. Id. at 1019.
268. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
269. Id. at 619 n.12.
270. See Old Federalism, supra note 17, at 1019.
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dial scheme retains the balance between state discretion and
federal oversight that Congress has intended to achieve,2 7' but
does so at a reduced cost. Such cost savings may be used to im-
prove the quality of medical care and access to services - a
result that is consistent with the overall congressional purpose of
the federal-state Medicaid program.
272
VI. Conclusion
The Wilder Court's holding that health care providers have
an enforceable right to adequate and reasonable Medicaid reim-
bursement rates permits use of the federal courts as initial
claims adjusters to prevent states from adopting reimbursement
schemes that do not comply with federal regulations. The courts,
however, will merely apply a deferential standard of review to
assess the reasonableness of the state's chosen reimbursement
methodology. Furthermore, the federal courts are unable to pro-
vide retrospective reimbursement for funds wrongfully withheld
and thus are limited in the relief they may grant to successful
complainants. Federal section 1983 actions are extremely costly,
diverting needed funds from the Medicaid program benefi-
ciaries, for whom the funds were earmarked, in contravention of
congressional intent. Inadequate administrative procedures have
made the section 1983 action more attractive to aggrieved health
care providers, even though it is far from a panacea.
Much unnecessary litigation may be avoided, however, by
congressional amendment of the current administrative appeals
process. Rather than act as a rubber stamp, the Secretary should
be mandated to take a preventive role by reviewing the findings
upon which states make their assurances. Furthermore, the state
Medicaid agencies should be required to provide a forum for
providers to challenge reimbursement rate "methodology." Be-
cause the revision would only apply to the appeals process, the
congressional desire to maximize states' discretion in the setting
of reimbursement rates would be retained. The state administra-
tive agencies possess a higher degree of expertise in the field
than the federal courts, and would be able to dispose of chal-
271. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046, 56,047 (1983).
272. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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lenges more efficiently and effectively. Unfortunately, the Wil-
der Court's decision will perpetuate the tide of costly litigation
to the Medicaid recipients' detriment until such legislative ac-
tion is taken.
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